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REPORT SUMMARY
•   This report has two components. Firstly, it discusses issues relating to cost sharing for
dryland salinity management. Secondly, it  presents an economic analysis and cost
sharing assessment of six dryland salinity management options for the Lower Eyre
Peninsula (LEP) in South Australia.
•   The management options are based on a recent study of the Wanilla Catchment (within
the LEP) by Stauffacher et al. (2000). These options involve different revegetation and
land-use scenarios in the catchment over a 20 year period. The major trade-off posed
by each scenario is the amount of cropping land revegetated against the additional land
prevented from becoming salt affected.
•   Options are explored first for the Wanilla Catchment (where there are few off-site
impacts on infrastructure and urban water users) and then for the entire lower Eyre
Peninsula.
Cost sharing
•   Cost sharing mechanisms are often proposed when there are significant public benefits
for a project and when the private costs of the project are much greater than its private
benefits.  Cost sharing provides a means for multiple stakeholders to receive benefits
that would otherwise be unattainable.
•   The key challenge in setting up a cost sharing arrangement is to find a logical basis for
the distribution of costs amongst the stakeholders. This need not necessarily imply that
each stakeholder pays an equal amount of the cost. Some stakeholders will stand to
make greater gains than others.  The extent and nature of individual rights, duties of
care and  community obligations need to be considered.
•   The primary economic tool for assessing the costs and benefits for each stakeholder is
benefit cost analysis (BCA). It provides a framework to assess whether a proposed
action is in the interests of project investors.  In the case of dryland salinity, the Nation
as a whole, the State of South Australia, the local community and individual
landholders may be interested in investing in a project. A BCA returns a net present
value (NPV) for the project being evaluated. The NPV can be thought of as the totalAn Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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project benefits minus the total project costs. If the NPV is negative the project costs
exceed the benefits and the project is not desirable from an economic perspective.
•   The cost sharing process proposed in this report applies BCA to determine the NPV for
the landholder (NPVlandholder) and the NPV for society (NPVsociety) of a dryland salinity
management project. Initially, the process includes only market goods and services in
the BCA. Non-market (intangible) goods and services include items such as
biodiversity and landscape aesthetics are not included in the initial analysis.  Once the
NPV of net market benefits have been calculated, the question of whether or not there
are sufficient non-market benefits to justify the project can be asked.
•   When the value for NPVlandholder is less than zero, the landholder will need to find
additional investors for the project to be worthwhile. For example, agroforestry on a
landholder’s private land will produce costs and benefits for the landholder.  Where the
costs exceed the benefits, it will be necessary for the shortfall to be covered if the
landholder is to undertake the agroforestry project.
•   Government, through programs such as the Natural Heritage Trust, must decide
whether the cost sharing or investment is in the interests of society. It can do this by
also undertaking BCA on the proposed project giving consideration only to market
goods and services. Typically the value for NPVsociety will also be negative. The key
policy question for government is whether the non market benefits (eg biodiversity,
landscape aesthetics) exceed the shortfall. If they do then cost sharing may be in the
interest of society.
•   The landholder’s duty of care is an important issue in the cost sharing framework. This
represents the minimum environmental performance standards which society demands
of land management activities. In general, government should not enter into cost
sharing arrangements which enable a landholder to avoid duty of care obligations. This
suggests that cost sharing is only justifiable for actions that go above and beyond the
duty of care.  Duty of care is an evolving concept that changes with time and
experience.
•   This represents an approach to cost sharing which can be used to assess whether
projects with negative net private, but significant net public, benefits should be funded
by government.An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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Lower Eyre Peninsula
•   Two case study regions were used in this study. The first of these is the Wanilla
Catchment located on the LEP in South Australia. The second case study region is the
LEP basin which covers the Wanilla Catchment. Both case study regions are shown in
figure 3 (page 20). Two case study regions were used to enable extrapolation of the
Wanilla model to a larger region. This enabled consideration of broader policy
implications of the detailed biophysical modelling undertaken for the Wanilla
Catchment by Stauffacher et al. (2000). The management options are listed in the table
below.





























































































•   An economic model was constructed for this study using spreadsheets and geographic
information systems (GIS). The major components in the design of the model involved:
1.  Developing a relationship between recharge reduction and salt affected area in
2020. This enabled an assessment of how the salt area changed over time and how
much land was lost or gained for agricultural production. The technique developed
built upon work by Stauffacher et al. (2000).
2.  Identifying gross margins for pasture and crop production. These were used to
calculate the returns from crop and pasture land-uses in each year. The main source
were gross margin booklets produced by the Primary Industries and Resources
department of South Australia.  Additional information was obtained from previous
benefit cost studies in the Tod River Catchment which is also on the LEP.
3.  A technique for determining yield decline in land areas surrounding a salt patch
was developed. This provided a more realistic model than the ’all-or nothing’
approach. The model assumes that relative crop yields are reduced by 50% in an
additional 10% of land surrounding a salt patch.
4.  Impacts of saline water and road maintenance were determined based on previous
studies conducted in the Murray Darling Basin (GHD 1999, Wilson 1999).
5.  A discount rate of 8% was used in all economic analyses.  This is in keeping with
previous BCA studies of a similar nature.
6.  Sensitivity analysis was conducted to assess the robustness of each key assumption.An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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Conclusions
•   The results of the models indicated extremely large negative NPVs for each dryland
salinity management option. Based on the results obtained the dryland salinity
management options proposed by Stauffacher et al. (2000) are not economically
feasible. The most significant results for the case studies are shown in tables 7, 8 and 9
on pages 37 and 39.
•   For the most favourable option to break even, the value of the non-market benefits (eg
biodiversity, drinking water quality) of dryland salinity control would need to be
around a minimum of $173m for the LEP basin and $10m for the Wanilla Catchment.
If these benefits accrue only to people living in the LEP region, each household (of
which there are roughly 6,600) would have to contribute roughly $26,600 or $2,500 per
year over 20 years. Costs of this magnitude would need to be carefully considered
against other options for avoiding the negative impacts of dryland salinity.
•   For the LEP, results suggest that broad-scale revegetation for dryland salinity
management is not economically feasible given returns expected from the current
options. There may, however, be site specific situations where targeted remedial works
will deliver benefits which exceed costs. Similarly, dryland salinity management
options will become more attractive if more profitable land-uses designed to reduce
recharge are identified.
•   These results have some implications for other parts of Australia but may differ if a
major population centre such as Adelaide was incorporated into the study region. A
large population such as Adelaide’s would mean that infrastructure costs of salinity
problems would rise dramatically. This would have the effect of increasing the NPV
values for the management options and their economic feasibility.An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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INTRODUCTION
As awareness of the dryland salinity problem is growing, so too is the pressure on
government to take remedial action. However, as yet few studies have been undertaken to
determine the cost burden placed on society or to evaluate the economic desirability of
remedial works. This report looks at these issues on the Lower Eyre Peninsula. It
commences with a discussion on cost sharing. This discussion deals with the fundamental
principles, which guide a cost sharing arrangement, and proposes a framework which can
be used for assessing cost sharing arrangements.
Following the discussion of cost sharing arrangements, the report presents a case study of
economic issues relating to dryland salinity management on the Lower Eyre Peninsula in
South Australia. The case study draws upon biophysical modelling undertaken by
Stauffacher et al. (2000). The biophysical model identifies six management options for
controlling dryland salinity in the Wanilla Catchment. These options involve different
revegetation and land-use scenarios in the catchment over a 20 year period. The major
trade-off posed by each scenario is the opportunity cost of land used for revegetation
against the benefits from preventing additional land from becoming salt affected.
Through the use of a benefit-cost analysis (BCA) framework the economic desirability of
catchment management options are appraised from landholder and social perspectives.
This provides information on the level of cost sharing required by governments to make
the management scenarios worthwhile for both landholders and society.
Some significant policy implications arise from this report. These relate to the economic
desirability of widespread catchment revegetation schemes in order to address problems of
dryland salinity. Whilst the findings of this report cannot be applied in other regions
without significant qualification, they do have some relevance to broader issues of dryland
salinity management.
The report is broken up into two sections. Section A describes cost sharing and proposes a
cost sharing framework. Section B presents case studies on dryland salinity management
on the Lower Eyre Peninsula. The case studies are based on the cost sharing framework
proposed in section A. At the conclusion of section B the policy implications of this study
are discussed. The final sections identify limitations of the model and highlight
requirements for further research and investigation into the management of dryland
salinity.An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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SECTION A: COST SHARING
Many of the on-ground works required to correct problems caused by dryland salinity are
not financially attractive to individual landholders.  This is because they will typically have
mostly social benefits (eg biodiversity, improved water quality, reduced extent of salt
affected land) but largely private costs (eg costs of revegetation). A solution is for
government, on behalf of society, to invest in on-ground works so that the social benefits
are realised. However, the benefits from on-ground works can often be greater for
landholders (on whose land the works are undertaken) than other individuals in society.
The question then becomes how much investment (if any) is it appropriate for government
to make in on-ground works so that society benefits.
This section of the report discusses the issue of cost sharing for on-ground salinity
management works. It commences with a discussion on the purpose of cost sharing. This is
followed by a section which deals with the issue of ’duty of care’ in relation to cost sharing
arrangements. Defining the duty of care is presented as a prerequisite for effective cost
sharing arrangements. Related to the duty of care are the beneficiary pays principle and the
polluter pays principle. These are described as alternative perspectives on the duty of care.
Following this, the technique of benefit cost analysis is briefly described. This is the major
economic tool used in cost sharing arrangements. It can be used to analyse the desirability
for on-ground works from multiple stakeholder perspectives. The section on cost sharing
concludes by proposing a process which could be applied on the Lower Eyre Peninsula.
Purpose of Cost Sharing
When two or more stakeholders stand to gain from a proposed action some form of cost
sharing may be appropriate to ensure an equitable distribution of costs.  Arguably, but
depending upon the nature of social contracts, both stand to benefit so, for an efficient
outcome when property right markets are imperfect, both should pay. The primary
requirement for cost sharing is that the benefits should exceed the costs for each
stakeholder group. If this requirement is not met, it would be irrational and against the best
interests of the ’net loss’ stakeholders to enter into a cost sharing arrangement.
Cost sharing is often advocated when a project or proposed action of some type is
excessively costly if funded by one stakeholder alone. If such a project can beAn Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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demonstrated to hold benefits for multiple stakeholders then cost sharing is a means of
obtaining benefits from the project which still exceed the costs.
Cost sharing is essentially a process of bargaining and negotiation. There is no ’correct’
solution to a cost sharing problem and no analytical tool that can simply deliver an answer.
The fundamental principle driving cost sharing arrangements is that each landholder will
only be involved if they perceive their benefits to be greater than their costs.  The amount
offered must make the perceived net benefits positive.
Duty of Care
Society imposes environmental and social performance requirements on many industries.
Examples of such requirements include maximum tolerable levels of pollution, thresholds
for environmental health risks and habitat preservation.  Meeting basic environmental and
social performance requirements is seen as a fundamental requirement of the landholder or
private enterprise. In other words, the enterprise has a duty of care to meet certain levels of
performance. Failing to meet these levels of performance can potentially lead to litigation
against the offending enterprise.
Generally, government should not expend public funds through cost sharing arrangements
which relieve landholders of their duty of care. When assessing whether or not a proposed
action is feasible the firm involved needs to factor any costs of meeting duty of care into its
decision making. If the costs of meeting baseline duty of care requirements for an
enterprise (eg cropping in a certain location) exceed that which can be met by the firm (eg
landholder) the enterprise should not be undertaken. In general, it is unreasonable to expect
society to cover the costs of meeting a duty of care. The duty of care represents the
minimum performance standards demanded by society of an enterprise.
In practice the use of duty of care to guide cost sharing arrangements is unclear. Typically
there exists much uncertainty regarding what represents a duty of care and what represents
performance above and beyond society’s expectations. Does a landholder have a duty of
care to preserve valuable natural habitat on their land? Does a landholder have a duty of
care to limit groundwater accessions that cause dryland salinity?  Both these actions will
have a cost to the landholder and provide benefits to society. But is it reasonable for
society to expect the landholder to meet these costs in full as part of their operation?An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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Deciding what represents a duty of care and what represents levels of environmental
performance significantly in excess of that duty is a complex question. However, it must be
addressed before cost-effective and consistent cost sharing arrangements can be developed.
Once established cost sharing can be considered for on-ground works or other projects
which increase performance beyond those minimum levels.
Currently, the performance requirements that collectively define each landholder’s duty of
care for agricultural production are hard to identify. Developing such requirements is
complex because they are likely to differ significantly in different agricultural regions and
for different agricultural enterprises. The development of performance requirements also
requires negotiations between government and industry groups to determine what is
appropriate. Such negotiations can take considerable time because they have significant
implications for the economic viability of enterprises under consideration and the
performance of industry.  Currently such requirements, where they exist, are defined in
legislation, local government plans and regulations and, also in catchment plans.  In the
future, environmental management systems may also help to define duty of care.
Another major difficulty of identifying the duty of care for cost sharing is the likelihood of
historical failures to understand long-term impacts.  The classic case is tree clearing which
in Australia's earlier agricultural history was encouraged.  Duty of care defines the limits to
current practice not historical practice.  In most circumstances, current land managers have
no duty of care for the correction of past mistakes which they themselves may not have
made or may have made under the advice and support of government agencies.
Perspectives on Who Pays
Much of the literature on cost sharing identifies principles which guide the governments in
setting the duty of care (eg MDBC 1996, Fargher and Moyle 1997, Kennelly 1989).
Examples of these principles are the polluter-pays principle, beneficiary-pays principle, the
beneficiary reimburses, and user-pays principle. In this report, it is argued that lines
between the various 'who pays' principles actually define duty of care. The polluter-pays
principle is at one end of the spectrum.  If adopted the polluter pays principle would
minimise the cost burden placed on government. Landholders would have a duty of care to
correct any dryland salinity problems occurring on nearby properties. A failure to do so
could lead to litigation and/or the application of disincentives.An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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At the other end of the spectrum is the beneficiary compensates principle. This principle
implies that the land-holder has no obligation to improve the status-quo.  Any change
which improves the welfare of people other than the landholder must be paid for.  One step
back from here is the beneficiary pays principle where beneficiaries are called upon to pay
for the “cost” of work done but not the “value” to them of the work done.
The issue as to whether government places high or low expectation on landholders to
manage and correct salinity problems is an ethical and practical dilemma. As duty of care
requirements are tightened agricultural enterprises become less profitable. However,
relaxing the duty of care requirements will typically increase burdens on public monies.
The question of cost sharing cannot be resolved by simply adopting one of the 'who pays'
principles.  In reality, there is more likely to be a spectrum of positions along a duty of care
continuum. This spectrum ranges from low duty of care to high duty of care. A low duty of
care will relieve the landholder of pressures but place a higher expenditure requirement on
public funds. Conversely, a high duty of care will place increased pressures on landholders
whilst reducing the pressure on public funds.  This trade-off is essentially an ethical
dilemma usually resolved through negotiation and informed debate.  The most common
position taken is that of arguing that landholders should not pay costs greater than the
benefits they expect to attain.  Governments, as representatives of society, should, at least,
pay for the cost of providing public benefits.
Figure 1 shows how costs to government and landholders vary along the duty of care









High Low DUTY OF CARE
Beneficiary compensates principle Polluter pays principle
Figure 1. The duty of care spectrum used for cost sharing arrangements. The various
'who pays' principles represent viewpoints along the spectrum. A lower duty of care
places a greater cost burden on society and a higher duty of care places a greater cost
burden on landholders.An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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Proposed Cost Sharing Process
Processes for cost sharing become increasingly complex as the number of stakeholders
increases. An acceptable simplification applied here is to assume the existence of only two
stakeholders, the landholder and society (represented through government).  This
simplification works for the majority of government cost sharing decisions faced in
programs such as the Natural Heritage Trust. The general question that must be addressed
in cost sharing is: Is it in the interests of society, as represented through a government
department, to cover additional costs required to have landholders implement changed
practices or on-ground works which lead to improved environmental quality above and
beyond that which is required of them through their duty of care?
The proposed cost sharing process is shown in figure 2. It is based on the application of
financial analysis and BCA to assess the benefits and costs incurred by both the landholder
and society. These techniques both involve the calculation of the net present value (NPV).
For the purposes of this document the process of determining the NPV can be considered
the same for both BCA and financial analysis. The NPV can be either positive or negative.
It equals the total discounted value of project benefits minus the total discounted value of
project costs. If a negative NPV is obtained the project costs exceed the benefits and it is
economically not worthwhile. In this report the term NPV shortfall is used to make
reference to the size of the NPV below zero, in other terms the value of the NPV multiplied
by minus one (ie NPV shortfall = NPV * -1). This way it is possible to refer to a large or
small NPV shortfall without confusion (it avoids having to refer to a large negative NPV).
The cost sharing process commences with a definition of the proposed activities. This
should clarify their objectives, methods and expected results. A decision then needs to be
made by both the landholder and government as to whether they will receive a clear benefit
as a result of the proposed action. If either stakeholder considers that they will not benefit
from the proposed activity then cost sharing is inappropriate. In this case the stakeholder
which does perceive gain must consider the merits of the project without assistance from
the other stakeholder.
The next major step is to consider whether the proposed activity falls under the
landholder’s duty of care. If it does cost sharing is inappropriate. On the other hand, if the
proposed action is considered to be above and beyond the landholder’s duty of care the
NPV is determined for the landholder using financial analysis and the government usingAn Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
15
Financial analysis for landholder
NPVlandholder
Positive
Cost sharing not required the proposed
action is funded by the landholder privately
Negative
Benefit cost analysis (exclude
intangibles). The project cost is the
shortfall in monies required to undertake
the proposed action (ie NPVlandholder)
plus any additional costs
NPVsociety
Positive
Subject to final approval by both the
landholder and government and
consideration of any matters not
adequately dealt with through the process
to this point it is recommended that the
government contributes to the shortfall1
necessary to make the project financially
attractive to the landholder.
Negative
Decide whether shortfall1 is
worth the intangible social
benefits (eg biodiversity,
aesthetics, water quality etc)
Not worth it
Worth it
Cost sharing arrangement is inappropriate and
proposed action is not undertaken
Assess whether proposed action has potential









Assess whether proposed action falls




Proposed action is not within the
landholder’s duty of care






1. The shortfall is the amount the landholder needs for the proposed action to become
attractive. It equals the NPVlandholder ×  -1.
Government reviews duty of
care for future cost sharing
applications
Figure 2. A cost sharing process for dryland salinity management.An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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BCA. In both these analyses non-market (intangible) goods and services are not included.
Due to difficulties associated with monetisation of non-market goods and services their
inclusion can serve to blur and confuse a cost sharing arrangement rather than improve its
clarity.
The NPV determined from the landholder through a financial analysis provides the next
decision point as to whether cost sharing is necessary or not. If the NPV for the landholder
is positive this means that they should be doing the project regardless of whether or not
there is government assistance. This satisfies the principle that government should only
enter into cost sharing agreements where necessary.
Assuming that cost sharing is not necessary when a financial analysis returns a positive
NPV for the landholder has some important implications. Firstly, it means that society
receives a ’free good’. By this stage in the proposed process government has already
decided that society stands to gain some benefit from the proposed activities. Allowing the
landholder to undertake the activity alone (even if it is in their own interests to do so) will
result in society receiving some benefits but not covering any of the costs. Secondly, a
positive NPV for the landholder may not necessarily lead to the proposed action being
undertaken. This could be because the financial analysis was incomplete or inaccurate,
there is a high level of risk or the landholder simply cannot obtain the necessary funds
(even though their expenditure will lead to greater gains).  Thirdly, it is noted that it would
be rare to get to this point in the cost sharing procedure and obtain a positive NPV.
Typically the need for cost sharing arises because the landholder does not perceive the
proposed action to be sufficiently in their private interests. This means that we would
typically expect a negative NPV to be returned from the financial analysis.
When the financial analysis does return a negative NPV it is necessary to conduct a social
BCA. In this BCA the cost of the proposed activity is the shortfall in funds required by the
landholder to undertake the proposed action plus any additional social costs. Social costs
and benefits include any impacts that are in any way harmful or beneficial to society. This
includes the benefits and costs accruing to landholders. In the BCA only market (tangible)
goods and services are included.
If the NPV for society derived from the BCA  is positive then the government, subject to
consideration of any matters not adequately dealt with in the process to this point (eg
availability of public funds for cost sharing), should pay the shortfall and undertake the
proposed action. If the NPV is negative the government needs to consider whether theAn Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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shortfall is worth the non-market (intangible) benefits. That is, the government decides
whether the NPVlandholder shortfall minus the NPVsociety shortfall is worth the intangible
benefits. In the case where government does consider the shortfall to be worth the
intangible benefits then, pending considerations of other matters, it should pay the shortfall
and have the project funded.An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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SECTION B: LOWER EYRE PENINSULA CASE STUDY
This section of the report presents an economic analysis and cost sharing assessment of six
options for dryland salinity management on the Lower Eyre Peninsula (LEP) in South
Australia. The management options are derived from a recent biophysical study of the
Wanilla Catchment, located within the LEP, by Stauffacher et al. (2000). Stauffacher et
al’s study sought to identify strategies for managing dryland salinity in the Wanilla
Catchment which could be applied in other catchments with similar characteristics. Their
study proposed six dryland salinity management options which involved revegetation
strategies for different regions within the Wanilla Catchment. The report can be used to
determine the area of salt affected land under each option by the year 2020.
The six salinity management options represent trade-offs between (i) the amount of
potentially productive land sacrificed for revegetation and (ii) the amount of land
prevented from becoming saline. This report considers the economic viability of each
option compared against the ’do-nothing’ scenario of maintaining current land management
practices in the catchment. It also discusses the implications of the results found for the
Wanilla Catchment in larger areas. This discussion is based on an extrapolation of the
Economic-Biophysical Models for Wanilla to the larger LEP drainage basin.
Information was generated for this report using geographic information system (GIS) and
spreadsheet models. The GIS was used to determine the current areal allocation of land-
uses in the Wanilla Catchment and LEP basin. It was also used to identify the amount and
location of infrastructure and vegetation. These data were then fed into a large spreadsheet
model which determined the NPV and benefit-cost ratio (BCR) for each dryland salinity
management option. Calculations were based on a 20 year period from 2000 to 2020. The
main driving factors in the models were (i) the area of lost production for agroforestry (ie
revegetation), (ii) the area of salt affected land lost or regained and (iii) the returns from
agroforestry. In the case of the LEP basin infrastructure impacts on roads and saline water
impacts on households were included. These impacts are not considered significant in the
Wanilla Catchment.
The following section of the report describes the characteristics of the Wanilla Catchment
and LEP basin. After this, six dryland salinity management options proposed for the
Wanilla Catchment are described. The next two sections describe how the economic model
was built and implemented. Following this, the results are presented and discussed. TheAn Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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final section details the limitations of the economic model and identifies directions for
further research and investigation into the management of dryland salinity.
Case Study Description
Two case study regions were used in this investigation. The first of these is the Wanilla
Catchment located on the LEP in South Australia. The second case study region is the LEP
basin which covers the Wanilla Catchment. Both case study regions are shown in figure 3.
Two case study regions were used to enable extrapolation of the Wanilla model to a larger
region. This enabled consideration of broader policy implications of the detailed
biophysical modelling undertaken for the Wanilla Catchment.
Both case study regions occur within the Eyre Peninsula region, the biophysical
characteristics of which are described by Jeffrey and Hughes (1994). The Eyre Peninsula
region has a Mediterranean climate with cool wet winters and hot dry summers. The mean
annual rainfall in the south of the Eyre Peninsula region, where the Wanilla Catchment and
LEP basin are located, is around 550mm/yr. In the Wanilla Catchment, the mean annual
rainfall is 520 mm/yr (Stauffacher et al. 2000). During winter months mean maximum
temperatures are usually around 16-17° C and in the summer they are around 24-25° C in
most coastal regions.
The LEP basin covers three statistical local areas as used by the Australian Bureau of
Statistics (ABS). These include the Lower Eyre Peninsula, Tumby Bay and Port Lincoln
statistical regions. Table 1 lists the number of households, population and total value of
agricultural production for each statistical region. The number of households was
determined by summing the number of dwellings owned, occupied and rented in ABS data
for 1996. In 1991 the major town centres were Port Lincoln (11,500 people), Tumby Bay
(1,150 people), Cummins (750 people) and Coffin Bay (350 people).
In tables 2 and 3, agricultural statistics have been totalled for livestock and crops. It can be
seen that the dominant form of livestock production is sheep and the dominant forms of



















Figure 3. Location of the Wanilla Catchment and Lower Eyre Peninsula Drainage basin.An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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Table 1. Number of people and households for the three statistical local areas covering the
Lower Eyre Peninsula based on the Australian Bureau of Statistics Integrated Regional
Database.
Item Lower Eyre Peninsula Port Lincoln Tumby Bay Totals
Households 1,240 4,433 880 6,553
Population 3,860 12,181 2,553 18,594
Table 2. Gross value of livestock production (’$000) for the three statistical local areas




Port Lincoln Tumby Bay Total
Wool - value 8,274 245 5,268 13,787
Sheep and lambs slaughtered - value 2,888 47 2,321 5,256
Cattle and calves slaughtered - value 898 45 238 1,182
Pig slaughterings - value 422 - 302 724
Honey - value 104 55 - 159
Goats slaughtered - value 8 - 150 158
Beeswax - value 11 3 - 14
Milk - value 2 - - 2
Total 12,607 395 8,279 21,281An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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Table 3. Gross value of crop production (’$000) for the three statistical local areas




Port Lincoln Tumby Bay Totals
Wheat 21,164 101 29,745 51,010
Barley 15,068 119 14,858 30,045
Lupins 3,165 60 3,272 6,497
Canola 1,623 - 1,097 2,720
Triticale 563 10 702 1,275
Oats 466 26 436 927
Faba beans 588 - 313 901
Pastures (excl lucerne) cut for hay 177 2 73 252
Chick peas 106 - 41 148
Cut flowers 80 - 27 107
Vetches for seed 30 - 50 80
Lucerne cut for hay 4 - 56 59
Grapes 28 14 - 42
Almonds 10 - - 10
Safflower 3 - - 3
Totals 43,074 331 50,670 94,076
Wanilla Catchment
The Wanilla Catchment covers an area of approximately 16,800 ha (168 square
kilometres). Problems of dryland salinity emerged in this region due to clearing of native
vegetation during the 1950s (Richardson et al. 1994). The area currently affected by
dryland salinity is roughly 8% (990 ha). This is expected to grow to an area of 15.3% by
2020 if current land management practices are continued (Stauffacher et al. 2000).
Land-uses within the Wanilla Catchment are allocated such that 15% (2,600 ha) is used for
the production of cereal crops and 58% (9,800 ha) is devoted to pasture, leaving a
remaining area of 4,400 ha (27%) which is mostly occupied by remnant vegetation. These
land-use areas were determined from an interim land-use map produced by the Bureau of
Rural Sciences in February 2000 as part of the National Land and Water Resources Audit.An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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The land-use map is a 1km Australia-wide grid which shows the dominant land-use within
each grid cell. It was combined with a vegetation map for the Wanilla Catchment used by
Stauffacher et al. (2000). Areas in the BRS land-use map classified as residual and not
covered by vegetation were assigned to pasture. This led to the establishment of a 1km grid
covering the Wanilla Catchment which coded each grid cell as either pastures, cereal crops
or residual (mostly existing vegetation). This grid is shown in figure 4. The salinity
management options for Wanilla are based on  revegetation in the upper and lower sections
of the catchment.
Lower Eyre Peninsula Basin
Dryland salinity over the whole LEP basin has not been subject to the detailed
investigations which have occurred in the Wanilla Catchment. Therefore, some fairly brave
assumptions are necessary. This study has assumed that the amount of land affected by
dryland salinity in the LEP basin is proportional to that in the Wanilla Catchment (ie it is
also 8%). It also assumes that the management options will lead to the same percentages of
land being lost to salinity.
Land-uses in the LEP basin were determined from the BRS land-use map as used in the
Wanilla Catchment. As with the Wanilla Catchment, each pixel was coded as either cereal
crops, pasture or residual. The land-uses were assigned such that cereal crops cover 73,000
ha (23%), pastures cover 175,000 ha (54%) and the residual area is 734,000 ha (22%).
Figure 4 contains a map showing the land-uses on the LEP basin. In order to model the
revegetation scenarios used in the Wanilla Catchment, it was necessary to identify an upper
and lower catchment. This was done by halving the area totals for the LEP basin. This
approach assumes that the upper and lower catchments both cover 50% of the LEP basin
and there is an equal break-up of land-uses in each.  Other definitions are possible.
Revegetation for Recharge Control
A catchment can be divided up into areas of recharge and discharge. A recharge area is the
region of the catchment within which water is absorbed into the soil and subsequently
enters the watertable. A recharge area will typically have a higher elevation than other
parts of the catchment. The discharge area has lower elevation and a higher watertable. It is
the region of the catchment from which water is discharged into rivers and streams.An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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Dryland salinity can be tackled by addressing watertable problems recharge or discharge
areas of the catchment.
The major cause of dryland salinity is the increase of recharge due to the clearance of deep
rooted perennial native vegetation in order to make the land available for agriculture.
Through the process of evapotranspiration native vegetation can have a significant effect in
taking water from the soil and releasing it into the atmosphere. Removal of native
vegetation means that the process of evapotranspiration is reduced and increased amounts
of water will be entering the groundwater table.
As increased amounts of water enter the groundwater system the watertable will rise. The
rise in the watertable mobilises salts, that occur naturally in the soil, taking them beneath
the plant root zone and to the soil surface. This leads to the problem of dryland salinity.
Crop yields in areas that are subject to the problem can be significantly reduced or crops
may be unable to exist entirely. Severely affected areas are sometimes referred to as salt
scalds or salt patches. Salinisation also means that water leaving the catchment is more
saline. This can cause problems for downstream agricultural, domestic and commercial
water users.
Re-establishing deep rooted perennial vegetation in recharge areas is widely regarded as
the most reliable long term solution to the problem of dryland salinity. It tackles the cause
of the problem rather than dealing with the symptoms which are predominantly evident in
discharge areas. Richardson et al. (1994) indicate that in the Wanilla Catchment deep
rooted perennial vegetation is the ’best-bet’ for reducing recharge and consequently the area
of salt affected land. However, there are many other effective means for controlling
dryland salinity.
Identifying areas of recharge in a catchment is one of the major challenges of dryland
salinity control (Peck 1993). Recharge areas will generally be at a higher elevation than
other parts of the catchment. They will also typically have no surface water run-off and
good internal drainage. Some recharge areas will have shallow soils over fractured rocks
and be poorly vegetated due to poor retention of water in the plant root zone (Peck 1993).
Generally recharge areas in a catchment will cover areas of productive or potentially
productive agricultural land. This creates a significant trade-off in the management of
dryland salinity. The main benefits of revegetation will be the increased area of landAn Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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Landuse in the Wanilla Catchment  Landuse in the Lower Eyre Peninsula
Drainage Basin 








Figure 4. Land-uses on the Wanilla Catchment and Lower Eyre Peninsula Drainage basin.  Derived from the Bureau of Rural Science’s Interim
Land-Use Map and overlay with vegetation  data layers in a geographic information system.An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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 prevented from becoming saline and the decreased salinity of water leaving a catchment.
The costs will be the loss of agricultural land in recharge areas. These costs can be offset
through the use of farm forestry (described in more detail later). Tree species used in farm
forestry can reduce recharge rates whilst providing income, albeit in 10-30 years from the
time of planting.
The major question faced in economic evaluation of revegetation for salinity control is
whether the opportunity cost of losing current productive land-uses in recharge areas
exceeds the benefits associated with decreased areas (and severity) of saline land in the
future. It is necessary to apply complex and advanced biophysical models in order to
generate information required to make this evaluation. Essentially, the biophysical models
must indicate how the area affected by salt changes over time.  Affects of this salt on
production potential and infrastructure must then be modelled along with the likely impacts
of alternative management options such as those likely to arise from dryland salinity.
Dryland Salinity Management Options
Stauffacher  et al. (2000) identify six dryland salinity management scenarios for the
Wanilla Catchment as listed in table 4. These management options involve changed land
use scenarios in the upper and lower sections of the Wanilla Catchment. Each option leads
to a given percentage reduction in current recharge rates. The percentage reduction in
recharge is used to determine the salt affected area by 2020. A linear growth or decline in
salt area is assumed to occur between now (2000) and 2020. Stauffacher et al. (2000)
indicate that the management options can be used as a basis for other catchments with
similar conditions to the Wanilla Catchment. In this study they are applied to the LEP
basin which surrounds and covers the Wanilla Catchment.
Adopting any of the six management options leads to abandonment of the current
catchment land-use and its replacement with an alternative scenario aimed at reducing
recharge. Therefore, the opportunity cost of any option is equal to the profit that would
have been derived from all current agricultural production in the catchment in each year
over the 20 year period. It is an opportunity cost because the current agricultural
production must be forgone to permit the new land-use pattern.
Each of the salinity management options leads to lower recharge rates than maintaining the
status-quo. This means that each will produce the benefit of maintaining a larger area forAn Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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agricultural production (less land is lost to salt) over the 20 year time period. However,
recharge reduction is achieved through the establishment of vegetation on potentially or
currently productive land. This incurs a cost. It is assumed that agroforestry is feasible for
revegetation. This will provide some returns from land areas revegetated, but not until the
trees can be harvested which typically takes a minimum of around 10 years. There is also
the cost of establishing agroforestry which occurs in the first year. Essentially, each option
involves a trade-off between the amount of area prevented from becoming salt affected and
the amount of area lost to production for revegetation.
Within the Wanilla Catchment urban water salinity and infrastructure impacts are
considered negligible. However, there are some significant infrastructure and saline water
impacts in the larger LEP basin. These are considered additional cost items which affect
the six management options and the status-quo option.





























































































Benefits and Costs of the Dryalnd Salinity Management Options
The benefits associated with the dryland salinity management option include the returns
from agricultural production and the reduced costs of infrastructure maintenance in each
year. The returns from agricultural production are calculated from gross margins obtained
from the different land uses. A gross margin is a ’dollars per hectare per year’ figure which
relates to a specific mode of agricultural production in a particular region or location. The
gross margins used in this study are discussed below. Benefits resulting from reduced
infrastructure maintenance were determined only for the LEP basin. The Wanilla
Catchment did not have significant infrastructure impacts. The annual reduced cost of
infrastructure maintenance is determined by:
•   calculating the cost of infrastructure maintenance for each year under the status-
quo option;
•   calculating the cost of infrastructure maintenance for each year under each
dryland salinity management option; and
•   subtracting the infrastructure costs under the dryland salinity management
option from the infrastructure costs under the status-quo option.
The costs of infrastructure maintenance will always be greater under the status-quo option
because it has a larger area of salt affected land in each year than any of the management
options. In the economic modelling discussed below, infrastructure costs are proportional
to salt affected area.An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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The cost associated with each management option is the income forgone from not being
able to continue current agricultural land uses in each year. This may be thought of as the
opportunity cost of the salinity management option in terms of agricultural production
potential forgone. Because this is the cost item used for each salinity management option it
is not meaningful to determine an NPV or BCR for the status-quo. The status-quo has no
opportunity cost of this type.
It is likely that additional benefits and costs exist. These have not been included due to the
lack of available data or difficulties associated with measurement. For example, there are
significant biodiversity impacts from dryland salinity in the Wanilla Catchment and
throughout the LEP. Aquatic ecosystems and riparian vegetation are being damaged by
highly saline water runoff.  Due to a lack of knowledge surrounding these issues and due to
problems of monetisation these costs and benefits have not been included in the analysis.
Economic Model Design
In constructing an economic model for this study, it was necessary to undertake several
key tasks. Firstly, it was necessary to develop a relationship between recharge reduction
and salt affected area in 2020. This enabled an assessment of how the salt area changed
over time and how much land was lost or gained for agricultural production. Secondly,
gross margins for pasture and crop production had to be determined. These were used to
calculate the returns from crop and pasture land-uses in each year. Thirdly, it was
necessary to  determine a gross margin for agroforestry. The gross margin for agroforestry
is used to determine the returns from revegetated areas. Fourthly, a technique for
determining yield decline in land areas surrounding a salt patch was developed. This
provided a more realistic model than the ’all-or nothing’ approach. Fifthly, a technique to
cost the impacts of saline water and road maintenance was required. Sixthly, it was
necessary to segregate social and landholder benefits and costs. This enables an assessment
of cost sharing requirements. Lastly, it was necessary to identify a discount rate to guide all
economic analyses.An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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Relationship Between Recharge Reduction and Salt Area
The relationship between recharge reduction and salt affected area is based on the
following statements in the report by Stauffacher et al. (2000): "under a 50% reduction in
recharge, the area [in the Wanilla Catchment] increases by the year 2020 to 11.7%" and
"a 90% reduction is required to allow the possibility of recovering some already saline
areas". Given that 8% of the catchment is currently affected it is possible to develop a
function which allows ’area affected in 2020’ to be determined from ’recharge reduction’.
This function is shown in figure 5. It is a disjointed linear function separated at a 50%
recharge reduction which corresponds to an 11.7% area affected in 2020. If necessary it
may be acceptable to assume that the percentage recharge reduction equals the additional
percentage area revegetated in recharge zones. However, this assumption was not needed
in this study. The recharge reduction was already given by Stauffacher et al. (2000).
Given that the current area of dryland salinity in the Wanilla Catchment is 8% (and is
assumed to be the same in the LEP) it is possible to determine the area of salt in each year
up to and including 2020. This is done by assuming the increase in salt area over the 20
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Figure 5. Assumed functional relationship between recharge reduction and the
area of the Wanilla Catchment affected by salt in 2020.An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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Gross Margins for Pastures and Crops
The gross margin used for pastures were based on livestock gross margins issued by
PIRSA. Sheep are by far the most significant form of livestock on the LEP. The gross
margin booklets for the 400mm plus rainfall zone in South Australia indicate that (i) a
stocking rate of seven sheep per hectare is attainable; (ii) with a gross price of $24 per
sheep; and (iii) variable costs of production at $14 per sheep. This produces a gross margin
of $70 per hectare. This is considered to be the value of pastoral land uses.
The gross margin for crops was based on the 1999/2000 "Crop Harvest Report" issued by
PIRSA.  An average was taken of the values for wheat and barley. This provides a yield of
3.05t/ha, gross returns of  $164/t and variable costs of $178/ha. Using these values the
gross margin for crops is $322/ha.
Gross Margin for Agroforestry
Several forms of agroforestry are potentially suited to the LEP region. These include a
Eucalypt woodlot, Radiata pine forest, Wide-spaced eucalypt agroforest, Wide-spaced pine
agroforest and Eucalypt firewood woodlot. Of these the Eucalypt firewood woodlot
provides returns within the shortest time period. Eucalypt firewood woodlots provide
returns around 10 years after planting. They are used to represent agroforesty in this study
because they provide returns twice (once every ten years) within the 20 year planning
period.
Values for timber yields and prices were derived from benefit cost analysis conducted for
natural resource management projects in the Tod River Catchment (AACM 1998). These
studies were based on an end product sold as firewood on-stump. They identify yield at
maturity as 110 t/ha and revenue at $20/t. The establishment costs for a Eucalypt firewood
woodlot are $880/ha  with a minimum period before return of 10 years (Farm Forestry
Note 1998).
Given these values it was possible to obtain a gross margin for agroforestry by calculating
an annual annuity over a 20 year growing and harvesting period. Additional maintenance
costs over this period mostly related to landholder labour. As this is not usually costed in
other gross margins these costs were also set to zero in this study. Over the 20 year period,
the establishment costs are only incurred once and harvesting is possible twice (at year 10An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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and year 20). This approach provides a gross margin of $68.87/ha/yr using the 8% discount
rate adopted throughout the study.  This is the gross margin used for agroforestry.
Determining Yield Decline Near Salt Affected Areas
Much of the biophysical modelling work on dryland salinity produces results which
suggest that land is ’all or nothing’ affected by dryland salinity. In reality, there is likely to
be a gradual shift in the severity of dryland salinity from an area where there is no yield
loss to an area where there is a high or complete yield loss. For the economic model used
in this study, a decline in yield loss was assumed to occur in areas surrounding a salt patch.
It was assumed that an additional 10% of land surrounding the salt affected area would
have a relative yield of 50% as shown in figure 6. The relative yield is used to adjust the
crop yields or sheep stocking rates in the gross margins described above.
In the case of agroforestry, this meant that the gross margin would be negative. Assuming
that an enterprise is abandoned when the gross margin falls below zero (this need not
necessarily always be the case) a gross margin of zero was assigned to agroforestry
occurring in partial yield areas surrounding salt patches. Pasture and crop gross margins do
not fall below zero but are significantly reduced.
Costing the Impacts of Saline Water
The cost impacts of salt in domestic water supplies were only considered in the LEP basin.
The Wanilla Catchment has overland waterflow which does not have a significant impact
Salt affected area (0% relative yield)
Partial salt affected area (50% relative yield) - equals
the salt affected area times 110% (10% extra)
Remainder of catchment (100% relative yield)
Figure 6. Method for modelling yield decline in areas surrounding a salt affected area.An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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on drinking water supplies. Most of the runoff from the Wanilla Catchment enters the
ocean.
Wilson (1999) lists several functions for costing the impacts of saline water supplies to
urban households. These functions were originally developed by GHD (1999) in a study
aimed at costing the impacts of dryland salinity in the Murray Darling Basin. The cost
functions use measurements of hardness and total dissolved solids (TDS), or just TDS
where hardness is unavailable, to determine the extra costs of saline water to households.
Table 5 lists these functions. As hardness measures were unavailable the functions using
just TDS were used in this study.
Table 5. Functions for costing the impacts of saline water supplies (GHD 1999).
Cost ($/household/yr) Function
Plumbing costs Cost = 0.020 ×  TDS + 24 (where TDS < 262 mg/l)
or
Cost = 0.081 ×  TDS + 8 (where TDS > 262 mg/l)
Hot water heater cylinder costs Cost = 0.051 ×  TDS + 73
Hot water heater relief valve costs Cost = 0.0068 ×  TDS + 29.8
Hot water heater electrical element cost Cost = 0.4 ×  (0.107 ×  TDS + 8.8)
Domestic filter costs Cost = 0.25 ×   (0.035 ×  TDS + 5)
Rainwater tank costs Cost = 0.25 ×  0.018 ×   TDS
Domestic water softener costs Cost = 0.048 ×  TDS
TDS = Total Dissolved Solids measured in mg/L
It was assumed that the increase in TDS over the 20 year period would be proportional to
the increase in salt affected area. For example, if the salt affected area grew by 5% it was
assumed that a TDS of 1000 mg/l in the year 2000 would be 1050 mg/l in the year 2020.
Given this assumption, management scenarios which led to an increased salt area also led
to increased costs from saline water supply.
The number of households in the LEP basin was determined from ABS statistics for the
Port Lincoln, Tumby Bay and the Lower Eyre Peninsula statistical regions. For each of
these regions, the ABS holds values for the number of dwellings that are fully owned,
rented or being purchased (1996 data was used). By summing the number of dwellings inAn Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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each of these categories and then summing for the three statistical local areas, the number
of households in the LEP basin was determined to be 6,553. This enabled a total dollars per
year figure to be estimated for each year over the twenty year period.
In order to apply the saline water costing functions it was necessary to identify current
TDS levels within the LEP basin and the number of households being affected by those
TDS levels. This was done using a recent study by Jolly et al. (2000). Amongst other
objectives Jolly et al’s study sought to assess stream/river salinity trends in South Australia.
The study provided a set of TDS measurements currently affecting the LEP. The water
supply sources for which TDS measures (for current conditions) are available include the
Uley South Basin, Uley Wanilla Basin, Polda Basin and Lincoln Basin. Jolly et al’s study
also indicates the portion of the Eyre Peninsula receiving supply from these basins. Table 6
lists the supply basins, their current TDS levels, the portion of their supply to the LEP and
the number of households using their supply. The number of households using the water
supply was simply determined as a proportion of the total number of households on the
LEP, which using the method described above is 6,553.
Table 6. Households affected by different water quality levels (measured using TDS in
mg/L) in the LEP basin (based on Jolly et al. 2000).







Uley South 50% 3277 500
Uley Wanilla 10% 655 500
Polda 5% 328 1000
Lincoln 10% 655 800
Remainder
3 25% 1638 700
1. This is the portion of supply to the Eyre Peninsula. It is assumed to be the same for the Lower Eyre
Peninsula drainage basin region used in this study.
2. A portion of the total number of households on the LEP basin which is roughly 6,553.
3. This is the remaining water supply not allocated to the Uley South, Uley Wanilla, Polda or Lincoln basins.
It is assigned a TDS which is the average of these basins.
Because the supply percentages for each of the basins summed only to 75% it was
necessary to identify a TDS for the remaining 25% of supply (and 25% of households).
This was done by creating a ’remainder’ category which had the average TDS for all other
basins.An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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Road Maintenance Costing Technique
Wilson (1999) identifies cost impacts on affected roads occurring within dryland salinity
affected areas as being $2,500/km/yr for main sealed roads, $1,500/km/yr for other sealed
roads, and $800/km/yr for gravel roads. According to Wilson (1999) these estimates have
not been widely applied and their accuracy is untested. However, there are few alternative
approaches. For this study, the road data was not neatly classified as indicated above.
Therefore the three cost impact measures were averaged and applied to all roads occurring
in salt affected areas. This provided a cost impact measure of $1,600/km/yr.
The roads in salt affected areas were determined by using the GIS. A road database from
SA Transport (supplied in 1999) was overlain with the LEP basin boundary. The total
distance of roads in kilometres was then determined. The kilometres of road affected was
then assumed to be proportional to the area of salt affected land. This value was multiplied
by the $1,600/km/yr figure to obtain a cost impact on roads for each year in the 20 year
period.
Segregating Landholder and Social Impacts
In order to facilitate cost sharing assessments it is necessary to determine whether the costs
and benefits accrue to landholders or society in accordance with the cost sharing
framework proposed earlier. In the case of the Wanilla Catchment the task was straight-
forward. Here all tangible costs and benefits included in the BCA were assumed to accrue
solely to landholders. This is because the only costs were land areas being lost from
production and the only benefits were land being prevented from becoming salinised so
that it could be used for agricultural production. No infrastructure impacts were identified
in the Wanilla Catchment.
In the LEP basin, infrastructure impacts on roads and saline water impacts were included
in the BCA. These impacts were assumed to represent benefits to society (not landholders).
This means that in the LEP basin two sets of NPV and BCR values were calculated. One
was for landholders and the other was for society.An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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Choosing a Discount Rate
Despite many research efforts there is still no definitive answer or foolproof method for
identifying an appropriate discount rate to be used in economic analysis. The discount rate
is a factor used to compare costs and benefits that occur in different time periods.  It is
usually expressed as a percentage. It is based on the notion that something of value is
worth more to us now than it will be worth if we receive it in, say, 10 years time. The
discount rate has strong implications for sustainable development and if it is high it can
disadvantage future generations. As different people and social groups are likely to have
different perspectives on what a discount rate should be, there is no single correct answer.
The discount rate used in this study is 8%. This is the same as that used in recent benefit
cost analyses for natural resource management projects (AACM 1998) in the Tod River
Catchment located within the LEP basin. Later in the study, this discount rate is
systematically varied to determine its impact on the final results.
Results
Results obtained from the model indicate the NPV and BCR for each scenario obtained
from a landholder and social perspective. They are presented in the following sub-sections
for the Wanilla Catchment and LEP basin. An internal rate of return (IRR) which is often
given in benefit costs analyses was not given because the cash flow was negative in each
year.
Wanilla Catchment
As infrastructure costs were not included in the economic model for the Wanilla
Catchment, the social BCA and landholder financial analysis are identical. For any of the
scenarios to be suitable for cost sharing the intangible (non market) benefits to society
must exceed the NPV shortfall. The NPV shortfall is the approximate amount which needs
to be made available to landholders across the whole catchment in order to make the
proposed scenario in their financial interest. Table 7 contains the NPV and BCR values for
each catchment management scenario. The tables also list the area lost to salt under eachAn Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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scenario. In simplified terms, the policy question is whether the NPV shortfall is worth the
intangible benefits associated with the area prevented from becoming salinised by 2020.
Where a management scenario performs worse on both NPV and on salt affected area in
2020 than another management scenario, it is considered dominated by that scenario.
Unless other information becomes available which makes a dominated scenario more
attractive it should not be considered in decision making. On this basis options A, B and F
are dominated by other options and should not be considered in decision making for the
Wanilla Catchment.
Table 7. Economic performance of the six dryland salinity management scenarios for the
Wanilla Catchment over a twenty year period (2000-2020).
Scenario NPV
(’$000)
BCR Ratio Catchment Area
Lost to Salt (%)
Catchment Area
lost to salt (ha)
Dominated By
Scenario*
Status-quo NA NA 15.30% 2,570 NA
A -$12,468 0.570 11.77% 1,978 C
B -$10,095 0.652 12.92% 2,171 D
C -$12,270 0.576 9.07% 1,523 -
D -$10,010 0.654 11.92% 2,002 -
E -$16,578 0.428 4.68% 786 -
F -$14,521 0.499 12.28% 2,062 A, C, D
* Where a management scenario performs worse on both NPV and on salt affected area in 2020 than another
management scenario, it is considered dominated by that scenario. Unless additional information becomes
available it should not be considered in decision making.
For all non-dominated scenarios it can be seen that the smallest NPV shortfall of roughly
$10m is for option D which leads to 11.9% of the catchment being affected by salt in 2020.
Option E will save the largest  area of the catchment from becoming salinised with only
4.7% affected in 2020, although it also has the largest NPV shortfall of $16.6m. The NPV
shortfall on option C is also very large at $12.3m. These results indicate that benefits from
non-market goods/services and avoidance of infrastructure impacts resulting from dryland
salinity in the Wanilla Catchment must have an extremely high value (of at least $10m
over 20 years) to make any of the proposed management scenarios worthwhile for society.An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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LEP Basin
In the LEP basin infrastructure costs of saline water impacts and road damage were
considered. This creates two sets of NPV and BCR values for each scenario. One set
applies to the landholders across the entire basin and the other set applies to society. The
benefit cost analysis includes the same benefits and costs for both landholders and society,
except for society it also includes infrastructure damage costs. In order to make an
alternative worthwhile for landholders, it would be necessary for society to cover the entire
NPVlandholder shortfall. The value of the intangible benefits associated with a scenario must
be greater than the NPVsociety shortfall. Because of the inclusion of infrastructure costs the
NPVlandholder shortfall will always be greater than the NPVsociety shortfall.
Table 8 contains an economic assessment of the management scenarios from the
landholder perspective (does not include infrastructure). Table 9 contains an economic
assessment of the management scenarios from the perspective of society (includes
infrastructure). The NPV shortfalls in table 8 represent roughly what the landholders across
the entire LEP basin would need  to be compensated in order to adopt the changed land-use
patterns required by the management scenarios. The NPV shortfalls in table 9 represent
what the non-market and any other benefits not included in the model must be worth to
society over the 20 year period for a scenario to be worth funding. The main policy
question for government is whether the intangible benefits exceed the NPV shortfalls when
infrastructure is included.
From both the landholder and social perspectives options A, B and F are dominated. This
means that consideration should only be given to options C, D and E. As would be
expected these are the same options that were non-dominated in the Wanilla Catchment.
The option which would require the least amount of compensation for landholders across
the LEP basin is option D with an NPV shortfall of $175m. However, it also leads to the
largest area of salt affected land (11.9%) of the three non-dominated options. Option E
requires the largest amount of landholder compensation at $307m but also has the lowest
area of salt affected land (4.68%) of all six options.An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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Table 8. Economic performance of the six dryland salinity management scenarios from the
perspective of landholders (infrastructure not included) for the Lower Eyre Peninsula basin






Lost to Salt (%)
Catchment Area
lost to salt (ha)
Dominated By
Scenario*
0 NA NA 15.30% 49,174 NA
A -$243,915 0.543 11.77% 37,835 C
B -$176,142 0.670 12.92% 41,538 D
C -$240,429 0.549 9.07% 29,143 -
D -$174,538 0.673 11.92% 38,298 -
E -$306,528 0.425 4.68% 15,042 -
F -$244,564 0.542 12.28% 39,455 A, C, D
* Where a management scenario performs worse on both NPV and on salt affected area in 2020 than another
management scenario it is considered dominated by that scenario. Unless additional information becomes
available it should not be considered in decision making.
Table 9. Economic performance of the six dryland salinity management scenarios from the







Lost to Salt (%)
Catchment Area
lost to salt (ha)
Dominated By
Scenario*
0 NA NA 15.30% 49,174 NA
A -$242,332 0.546 11.77% 37,835 C
B -$175,076 0.672 12.92% 41,538 D
C -$237,633 0.555 9.07% 29,143 -
D -$173,020 0.676 11.92% 38,298 -
E -$301,764 0.434 4.68% 15,042 -
F -$243,208 0.544 12.28% 39,455 A, C, D
* Where a management scenario performs worse on both NPV and on salt affected area in 2020 than another
management scenario it is considered dominated by that scenario. Unless additional information becomes
available it should not be considered in decision making.
As is to be expected the NPV shortfalls decrease when the social perspective, which
includes infrastructure, is taken. This indicates that when infrastructure costs are includedAn Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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the management scenarios become more favourable. However, there is not much
difference between the NPV values obtained with infrastructure and the NPV values
obtained without infrastructure. This indicates that infrastructure does not have a major
impact on the economic desirability of the dryland salinity management options. Even with
infrastructure all management scenarios have NPVs well below zero and benefit cost ratios
well below one. Of the non-dominated options, option D requires the lowest value (at least
$173m) to be placed on non-market benefits in order to be worthwhile for society. In order
for option E, the most costly option for government, to be worthwhile for society its non-
market benefits need to be valued at least $302m.
Relative Income Streams
Figures 7,8 and 9 show the un-discounted stream of income before fixed costs of
production over the 20 year period for the Wanilla Catchment, LEP Basin (without
infrastructure) and LEP Basin (with infrastructure). These graphs compare the status-quo
with each of the six dryland salinity management options. The graphs for the Wanilla
Catchment and the two LEP Basin scenarios are similar. It can be seen that under each
management option, except for option E, the benefits decrease over time. Over time the
income received increases slightly for option E because it actually reclaims currently salt
affected land. All other management options loose land to salt over the 20 year period.
The status-quo provides greater income in each year for all three graphs. The opportunity
cost of each management option in any given year is the income associated with the status-
quo minus the income associated with the management option. Extending the lines of the
graphs beyond the 20 year period would identify a point where the status-quo curve
intersects the curve associated with one of the management options. It would not be until
this point in time that any of the management options would economically out-perform the
status quo. However, it is unlikely that such a point would ever be reached. The catchment
(or basin) is likely to reach equilibrium before this happens. At equilibrium the salt area
ceases to increase significantly in each year.
Because the income from the status-quo exceeds the income from all the management
options in each year, the effect of the discount rate may appear counter-intuitive. By
increasing the discount rate the performance of each management option is improved (ie
they obtain higher NPVs). Conversely, decreasing the discount rate will lead to worsenedAn Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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performance of the management options (ie lower NPVs). This can be seen in the
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Status Quo A B C D E F
Figure 8. Relative income stream (un-discounted) from agricultural production in the LEP











































Status Quo A B C D E F
Figure 9. Relative income stream (un-discounted) from agricultural production in the LEP
Basin with infrastructure damage avoidance benefits included.
Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity of the above results to variations in key assumptions was explored by
systematic random variation of key variables. The variables altered include:
•   the discount rate (%);
•   the additional area of land surrounding the salt affected area which is subject to yield
decline (%);
•   the relative yield in the area of yield decline (%);
•   the yield obtained from timber in agroforestry (t/ha); and
•   the price of timber in agroforestry ($/t).
These variables were chosen because there was most uncertainty surrounding their true
values. The sensitivity analysis chose 100 randomly selected values within ± 50% of the
original value. Each variable was systematically varied whilst the others were held at their
original value. This process generated 100 values for NPV and BCR for each of the
variables. The output is shown for the Wanilla Catchment in Appendix A. This appendix
contains a series of graphs which show the variation in NPV as a response to variation in
the above listed variables. Although not shown in this report sensitivity analysis for the
LEP basin landholder perspective and social perspective was undertaken in the sameAn Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
43
manner as for the Wanilla Catchment. It was found that the LEP models were sensitive in
almost exactly the same way as the Wanilla Catchment model.
From the graphs, it can be seen that the results are sensitive to variations in the discount
rate, timber yield and timber price. The results are insensitive to variations in the additional
area of land subject to yield decline and the relative yield in the area of yield decline. This
suggests that any further refinement of the model should concentrate on better defining the
discount rate, timber yield and timber price. By comparison the area of yield decline and
relative yield within that area of little importance.
It is worth emphasising that despite considerable variation of the discount rate, timber yield
and timber price (± 50%), the NPV shortfall is extremely large in every case. No single test
produced a positive NPV and the maximum values for NPV were all well below zero. This
suggests that the results may be interpreted as a large NPV shortfall for each scenario. For
even the best performing scenario to be suitable for cost sharing (ie worthwhile for society)
the value of the intangible benefits would need to be extremely large.
Model Limitations
As an abstraction or simplification of reality every economic model necessarily has
limitations. The key question is the extent to which the model’s departure from reality
undermines the value of the results. In other words: Is the underlying message of the model
reliable? The following limitations of the economic models applied in this study are not
considered sufficiently important alter the central messages conveyed in the above
discussion. The main limitations of the model are as follows:
1.  Naive farming patterns. This economic model assumes that a farmer will continue to
apply the same form of production on an area of land as it gradually becomes salt
affected over the twenty year period. In reality a farmer is likely to switch enterprises
as salt reduces the returns from what is currently being done. A typical enterprise
switch on the LEP that will occur as land becomes increasingly salt affected is: wheat
→  barley →  puccenelia.
2.  Constant prices for crop, pasture and agroforestry production. This model has
identified the current prices for wheat, barley, sheep and agroforestry products. TheseAn Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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have been assumed to remain constant over the 20 year time period. In reality these
prices may undergo considerable shifts.
3.  Road and saline water impact assessment techniques. The road and saline water impact
assessment techniques were taken from other studies largely based on the Murray
Darling Basin. Some accuracy may be lost when these studies are applied to the LEP.
4.  Linear increase in the area of salt affected land. It is assumed that the area of salt
affected land increases over time according to a linear function. In reality it may reach
a threshold where the rate of increase goes down. This may occur as the catchment
approaches equilibrium.
5.  Discount rate. A discount rate of 8% was assumed. This is consistent with other
economic analyses of this type. Whether or not this is correct cannot be said as there is
no such thing as a ’correct’ discount rate.
6.  Water quality and salt area relationship. It was assumed that the area of increase in salt
affected land was directly proportional to increases in total dissolved solids in water
supply. Many other factors may influence this relationship.
Policy Implications
Based on the results obtained from the economic model presented in this report it is
unlikely that the dryland salinity management options proposed by Stauffacher et al.
(2000) will be considered economically feasible. The amount of public expenditure
required to attain the non-market benefits (eg biodiversity, drinking water quality) of
dryland salinity control would need to be around a minimum of $173m for the LEP basin
and $10m for the Wanilla Catchment.
Given that the population of the LEP basin region is approximately 18,600 people and that
benefits of salinity control to people living outside the region will be minimal these
expenditures would represent an extremely large opportunity cost (eg hospitals, schools,
roads) for the LEP community. It is unlikely that the non-market benefits will be
sufficiently high to justify opportunity costs associated with any of the management
options. If the benefits accrue only to people living in the LEP region, each household (of
which there are 6,553) would have to contribute roughly $26,600 or $2,500 per year over
20 years. Costs of this magnitude would need to be compared against other options forAn Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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avoiding the negative impacts of dryland salinity. For example, a variety of engineering
structures could be used to avoid the detrimental impacts of saline water on urban
households. It may even be appropriate to consider alternative water supply options.
Despite this seemingly bleak outlook, it would be inappropriate to conclude that any
attempts to repair or prevent dryland salinity on the LEP are not worthwhile. It is likely
that there will be specific cases, localised both spatially and temporally, where salinity
control projects will deliver benefits which exceed project costs. Such projects are likely to
be highly targeted to combat a specific problem and preserve a specific area or natural
habitat. These projects are likely to emerge more often as the biophysical processes
controlling dryland salinity on the LEP are better understood.
A conclusion that can be reached from the economic model is that catchment or basin-wide
revegetation projects aimed at controlling dryland salinity are not likely to deliver benefits
which exceed costs over a 20 year time period.
The findings of this study will have implications for other regions of Australia. They tend
to support the need for ’living with salt’ options found in parts of New South Wales. They
also support economic analysis by Herbet (1999) which found that revegetation to control
dryland salinity in Western Australia typically has low benefit cost ratios. Of nine salinity
management strategies evaluated by Herbet (1999) only two received benefit-cost ratios
above one (1.64 and 1.37) and the remaining seven had benefit-cost ratios ranging from
0.15 to 0.45.
However, the models may provide different results if they were applied in a region which
impacted on a major city such as Adelaide. The increase in population  would lead to a
massive increase in the infrastructure impacts associated with dryland salinity. This could
be sufficient to lower the NPV shortfalls associated with the six dryland salinity
management options to feasible levels.
This study highlights a need for further research into economically feasible techniques for
dryland salinity management. It would be desirable to undertake similar studies within
regions that affect major cities with large populations. It would also be desirable to
prioritise salinity control projects throughout South Australia which have targeted and
specific benefits. It is works of this nature that are likely to be of most benefit in the
control of dryland salinity.An Economic Analysis and Cost sharing Assessment for Dryland Salinity Management
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APPENDIX A
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Variation in NPV as a response to variation in the additional area of land subject to yield 
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Variation in NPV as a response to variation in relative yield within the area of yield decline 
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